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The Soviet Economy in a Global Perspective

A Research Paper

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The Soviet Economy in a Global Perspective:

Summary

Information available as of 31 December 1988 was used in this report. When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, he assumed command of an economy that was impressive in terms of size and historical performance:

- The estimated value of the USSR's gross domestic product (GDP) was second only to that of the United States.
- The Soviet Union ranked first in the world in the annual production of oil, iron ore, and steel and was the second largest producer of machinery.
- Between 1950 and 1975 Soviet economic growth had outstripped that of the United States, and the Soviet economy had increased from about onethird to almost 60 percent of the size of the US economy.

Since the mid-1970s, however, the economy had been faltering. Soviet growth had decreased sharply, and by the late 1970s the ratio of Soviet to US GDP had slipped. The USSR now lags the West even further in many important respects:

- Soviet labor productivity as measured by GDP per worker is less than
 half that of the United States, below that of most developed countries,
 and even below that of some East European countries.
- The West's technological lead over the USSR is large and increasing in fields such as computer-operated machine tools and computer software, in which the West is as much as 12 years ahead.
- Valuable energy resources are being used far less efficiently than in most other developed countries

Indeed, although clearly a military superpower, the Soviet Union has an economy that in many ways is like that of a developing country. The level of per capita consumption in the USSR, for instance, is far below that of the developed Western countries and Japan. It is about one-third that of the United States and is more comparable to that of countries such as Mexico and Brazil. Moreover, the Soviet pattern of consumption and output more closely resembles that of less developed nations than that of the West:

- The per capita consumption of consumer durables is below that of many Latin American countries, and stocks of high-quality consumer durables such as passenger cars and modern appliances are extremely low.
- Per capita expenditures on consumer services are markedly lower than in the developed West and only slightly higher than in such countries as Uruguay and Portugal.

• Compared to other nations at a similar level of development, the Soviet Union has a much larger agricultural sector. Indeed, the share of agricultural output in GDP in the USSR is similar to the share in Turkey and the Philippines.

In addition, the USSR—a large net importer of manufactured goods and an exporter primarily of raw materials and fuels—has a trade pattern more like that of Egypt and Mexico than that of the major industrial states

The Soviets have set economic targets that, if realized, would narrow the gap between themselves and the West. We believe, however, that these targets are out of reach. We expect that the Soviet Union will have difficulty maintaining its position relative to the West, much less closing the gaps in technological development, productivity, or living standards.

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Scope Note


General Secretary Gorbachev's commitment to revitalizing the Soviet economy stems, in large part, from a realization that the USSR is falling further behind the industrialized West in its pace of technological advance and its citizens' quality of life. This paper seeks to put Gorbachev's concerns in context by comparing the USSR's economic performance with that of other countries—ranging from the least developed nations in Africa to the highly developed, modern ones of the West. The paper does not attempt to provide a definitive analysis of Moscow's economic difficulties or to estimate the future course of economic development in the USSR.

To compare the economic performance of various countries, estimates of the value of their output of goods and services have been converted from indigenous currencies into dollars using purchasing power parities, as described in an appendix. Most comparisons are made for 1985—the last year for which data are available and the year Gorbachev became General Secretary—but we believe they reflect reasonably well the economic conditions in the USSR today. Such estimates should not be regarded as precise measures. They provide, at best, an approximation of the relative levels of economic development and performance among countries of the world with very diverse systems

Readers should also be aware that, in contrast to this paper, some CIA publications use market exchange rates to convert estimates of economic output in other currencies into dollars. As a result, some of the estimates presented here differ from those of other CIA publications

Figure 1 Gross Domestic Product of the Seven Largest Economies, 1985

Trillion 1980 international dollars



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The Soviet Economy in a Global Perspective (

Methods and Sources

To compare the Soviet Union's economic performance with that of other countries—and, indeed, to make any valid international comparison—it is necessary to express the activities of the countries being compared in common terms. The terms used in this report include physical quantities, such as numbers of automobiles and televisions, and monetary measures. For the most part, the monetary measures are taken from the United Nations' International Comparison Project (ICP), which uses "purchasing power parities" (PPPs)—currency conversion factors for specific types of goods and services—to convert the reported value of various nations' goods and services from indigenous currencies into a common set of prices

The use of PPPs is a more appropriate method for making international comparisons of the volume of production and consumption of final goods and services than is the use of market exchange rates. Because PPPs are synthetic indicators based on a comparison of prices for a specific sample of goods, they do not display the volatility of exchange rates, which can vary sharply from day to day. In addition, because PPPs vary from one category of goods and services to another, they "correct" for the distortions in a given country's price structure resulting from price subsidies and highly differentiated excise taxes. In contrast, the use of market exchange rates, which must be applied indiscriminately to all the goods and services produced in a given country, would completely mirror that country's price structure, distortions and all. The PPPs used in the ICP, moreover, are designed to mitigate the different types of distortions that inevitably result when one country's output and, thereby, its resource allocation choices are expressed in another currency. It does so by the use of so-called international dollar measures, which reflect world average prices rather than those of any one nation

The Soviet Union, unfortunately, has never participated in the ICP. As a result, we lack the type of detailed dollar measures of Soviet economic performance that we have for the participating countries. We have, however, been able to link the CIA's dollar estimates of Soviet production and resource allocation—generated with PPPs developed for US-Soviet comparisons—to the ICP estimates. A description of the procedures used to accomplish this linking and additional information on purchasing power parities and "international dollars" are presented in appendix A

Gorbachev's Inheritance: A Large but Faltering Economy

The Soviet economy is the second largest in the world (see figure 1) and, until recently, it had grown at an impressive rate. Whereas in 1950 the Soviet economy was about one-third the size of the US economy, by 1985 it was more than one-half the US economy's size and approximately 50 percent greater than the size of the Japanese or Chinese economies.' The gross domestic products (GDPs) of West Germany, India, and France are about one-third the size of the Soviet GDP.2 (The inset provides a broader comparison of the economies of Western and Eastern Bloc nations.)

'Estimates of the size of the Chinese economy vary widely. To avoid using official Chinese data—which probably understate the value of services and may not be calculated according to Western practices—converted to US dollars using administratively set exchange rates, we have elected, for the purposes of this paper, to estimate Chinese gross domestic product in dollars using the physical indicator method (see appendix B). (U)

¹ Throughout this paper, GDP will be used for comparisons of total economic output rather than the more familiar gross national product (GNP). The difference between the concepts is slight. GDP equals GNP less payments for labor and capital services exchanged with other countries.

A Comparison of Economic Strength, East Versus West


A comparison that juxtaposes the economies of the CEMA nations as a group with those of the United States and nations of the European Community provides an interesting perspective on how well the Communist Bloc has fared relative to the capitalist West. The European Community alone has a combined GDP roughly one and a half times larger than that of the Soviet Union and about 10 percent larger than that of all of CEMA. When the United States is added, Western GDP is more than twice as large as that of the Soviet Bloc. (U)

Gross Domestic Product, East Versus West, 1985

Trillion 1980 international dollars

United States
European Community
CEMA except USSR

USSR



^aEuropean Community member nations are Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

plus United States a

^b CEMA member nations are Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and Vietnam. ,

Table 1 Soviet Rank in Production of Selected Industrial Goods

	1913		1987		
	World	Europe	World	Europe	
Electric power	8	6	2	1 .	
Petroleum	2	1	ı	1	
Coal	6	5	3	1	
Steel	5	4	1	1	
Cotton fiber	5	1	3	1	
Iron ore .	5	4	1	1	
Coke	4	3	1	1	
Cement	5	4	2	1	
Granulated sugar	4	2	1	1	

Source: Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1987, p. 625.

This table is Unclassified.

The Soviet Union outproduces most or all Western nations in many major industrial commodities. In fact, the USSR ranks first in the world in the production of such important commodities as oil, crude steel, and iron ore (see table 1). (U)

Relative Level of Economic Development

Although the Soviet Union's rank in terms of overall GDP or the production of specific types of goods is impressive at first glance, a comparison of per capita GDP among a large sample of countries gives a different picture (see figure 2). The Soviet Union ranked well below Western developed nations but above the newly industrialized and less developed Western countries in 1985. Soviet per capita GDP that year was less than half that of the United States, for instance, but 30 to 50 percent larger than that of Mexico or Greece. (U)

Unclassified

Thousand 1980 international dollars

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United States	
Canada	are recessare aborement
Denmark	
West Germany	
France	better a constant of the
Japan Field d	per and sections are consequently
Finland	
United Kingdom	genginarpasanan (1) (6) (6)
East Germany	
Czechoslovakia	
Italy	
Spain	
USSR	
Hungary	
Bulgaria	
Yugoslavia	
Poland	
Greece	
Romania	
Mexico	
Portugal	
Taiwan	
Argentina	
Uruguay	37772025
Brazil	
South Korea	
Costa Rica	1 1/2 to
Paraguay	
Guatemala	
Sri Lanka	
Indonesia	
Pakistan	
China	
India	
Кепуа	
Nigeria	
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Figure 3 Composition of GDP, 1980

Percent

Consumption

Investment

Defense and other

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Note: Most shares are calculated using expenditure data in each nation's indigenous currency from Phase IV of the UN International Comparisons Project. Soviet shares are at 1982 factor cost.

Dividing the Pie

Comparisons of per capita GDP do not necessarily provide an accurate indication of relative standards of living, in part because the share of GDP allocated to consumers varies considerably among countries. Indeed, the share of consumption in Soviet GDP is small. (Figure 3 illustrates the share in 1980, the latest year for which data are available.) In the United States, about 69 percent of GDP went to consumption in 1980, compared with only 55 percent

The Soviet share is calculated from ruble estimates of consumption and total GDP at adjusted factor cost—that is, in prices "corrected" for the distortions resulting from the inclusion of large and highly differentiated excise taxes, subsidies, and profit rates in the state-administered, "established" prices of Soviet goods and services.

in the USSR. In addition, the quality of goods produced in the USSR—which is notoriously poor in general—is particularly poor with respect to consumer items. Quantitative comparisons of this type do not fully account for such differences in quality and therefore probably overstate the Soviet position (see inset on page 5).

As a result of the low priority accorded to consumer needs, Soviet per capita consumption, valued in international dollars, is far below that of the major developed nations—about one-third that of the United States and about 55 percent that of Japan and most of the major West European nations (see figure 4). The Soviet Union, in fact, was more comparable to countries such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil in terms of the level of per capita consumption in 1985. Moreover, the Soviet position relative to the rest of the world has not improved over the past two decades. Although the Soviet Union was able to narrow somewhat the difference in per capita consumption between itself and the United States before 1970, since then the gap has remained steady. Moreover, the gap between the Soviet Union and most developed nations has steadily widened, and, in recent years, several newly industrializing nations such as Brazil and Korea have made significant gains relative to the Soviet Union (see figure 5)

Although the Soviet population is becoming increasingly aware of the way in which people of other nations live, the average citizen is probably more apt to compare his quality of life with that of his parents or grandparents than with Westerners. Therefore, these conclusions about relative living standards may not reflect the perceptions of Soviet consumers

Figure 4
Per Capita Consmption, 1985

Thousand 1980 international dollars





Figure 5
Per Capita Consumption, 1960-85

Index: USSR = 100



Examining Quality Differences

The state of affairs in the entire national economy taken into account in our calculations, nor is the will depend on how things will proceed with raising limited Choice available to Soviet consumers style the quality of four put.

Mikhail Gorbachev GNovember 1986

Although measures expressed in value terms—for example in adollars—have the potential of being able to reflect differences in quality as well as quantity the comparisons of the economies of the USSR and developed Western nations made in this paper do not fully take into account the effectalls poor quality and narrow assortment of goods and services available in the USSR Solver machinery or example kinds to be technically interior—that is, it does now have the capabilities of Western counterparts—and of lower quality—for instance it is usually less durable A recent anisle my he Solver pressive ported that factory—fresh solver and the completely overhauted by he western distributor before they could be solved to Western distributor before they could be solved which would not easily bush as uniformation that is a support of the consolated Because value based in the anisolated Because value based in the appeal counters do not fully account for one aspects of quality such as altrability and convenience, they probably oversation the Solver position.

This bias is particularly strong in comparisons of living standards: Deficiencies in style, destan land attractiveness of Soviet consumer items are not taken into account in our calculations, nor is the limited choice available to Soviet consumers. No merous products that are common in Western households. For example, dishwashers and air conditioners, are either not produced at all or produced in minuscule quantities in the USSR Nor abstraction of time Soviet consumers specinordinate argount of time Soviet consumers specin line of trudging from store to store in search desired tems, and the notoriously poor quality of consumers consumers.

The cargetite gime is clearly concerned about the low quality of Soviet products (Gorbache of the has made improving product quality one of the principal coals of his program to revitalize the Soviete conomy. Speaking before a special estate of the Council of Ministers in June 1988 Product quality of the Council of Ministers in June 1988 Product of the Council of Ministers in June 1988 Product of the Council of Ministers in June 1988 Product of the Council of Ministers in June 1988 Product of the Council of Ministers in June 1988 Product of the Council of Ministers in June 1988 Product of the Council of Ministers in June 1988 Product of the Council of the Co

Patterns of Consumption Expenditures in Indigenous Currencies

In comparisons of similar nations' economies, pat—The table below shows the pattern of consumption are often examined in terms of a expenditure story the 12 mation with a large of the advantage of reflecting the way in which con—state the advantage of reflecting the way in which con—state the significant differences in process they actually face in the marketplace. If nations it is example, in international advantage of reflecting the way in which con—state they actually face in the marketplace. If nations it is example, in international advantage of reflecting the way in which considers the significant differences in the prices of the significant differences in the signifi another country the reverse is true it would require quite different expenditure patterns; by the nations respective consumers do arrive at the same ratio of foods to durables in both nations.

In comparisons of similar nations' economies, par ... The table below shows the partern of consumption

Consumption Expenditure Patterns in Selected Countries, 1985

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	Pool	Soit Cheds	Consumer Ducables	ete (III)	Depending	Henseholi Services
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Table 2 Consumption Patterns, 1985

1980 international dollars per capita

	Food	Soft Goods	Consumer Durables	Health	Education	Household Services	Total
Sweden	788	471	612	678	368	1,785	4,703
	(16.7) •	(10.0)	(13.0)	(14.4)	(7.8)	(38.0)	(100)
United States	1,612	983	1,440	630	572	3,304	8,542
	(18.9)	(11:5)	(16.9)	(7.4)	(6.7)	(38.7)	(100)
Japan	968 (19.7)	549 (11.2)	477 (9.7)	632 (12.9)	288 (5.9)	1,994 (40.6)	4,909 (100)
West Germany	1,233 (21.2)	1,080 (18.6)	1,026 (17.6)	497 (8.5)	313 (5.4)	1,670 (28.7)	5,819 (100)
United Kingdom	1,342 (25.9)	661 (12.8)	679 (13.1)	435 (8.4)	295 (5.7)	1,762 (34.1)	5,174 (100)
France	1,705	1,140	816	624	374	1,849	6,509
	(26.2)	(17.5)	(12.5)	(9.6)	(5.7)	(28.4)	(100)
Italy	1,317	756	617	268	366	1,327	4,651
	(28.3)	(16.3)	(13.3)	(5.8)	(7.9)	(28.5)	(100)
USSR	844	386	194	200	501	585	2,711
	(31.1)	(14.2)	(7.2)	(7.4)	(18.5)	(21.6)	(100)
Portugal	719	318	123	114	248	751	2,274
	(31.6)	(14.0)	(5.4)	(5.0)	(10.9)	(33.0)	(100)
reland	955 (34.1)	330 (11.8)	238 (8.5)	240 (8.6)	229 (8.2)	810 (28.9)	2,801 (100)
Greece	1,262 (39.8)	449 (14.2)	145 (4.6)	136 (4.3)	157 (5.0)	1,017 (32.1)	3,167 (100)
Furkey	722	341	130	31	76	299	1,599
————————————————————————————————————	(45.1)	(21.3)	(8.1)	(1.9)	(4.8)	(18.7)	

Percent of total consumption in parentheses.

Living Standards

Consumption Patterns. This section compares the flow of consumer goods and services in the USSR with that in a cross section of other countries. Here, as throughout most of this paper, "international dollars" are used to compare patterns of actual consumption to remove the effects of differences in relative prices among countries (see table 2). These data do not show how Soviet consumers—or consumers in any other country—actually disperse their money income; rather, they illustrate the mix of goods and services actually acquired by consumers. (The inset discusses patterns of consumption expenditures calculated in indigenous currencies.


According to these data, consumption patterns in the USSR differ markedly from those in the developed Western countries. Food, for example, accounts for about one-third of total consumption in the USSR, valued in international dollars, while the corresponding share in most developed Western countries is closer to one-fifth or one-fourth. The share of consumer services in total consumption in the USSR is small compared with that of Western nations—about 22 percent in the Soviet Union versus 39 percent in the United States and 41 percent in Japan. Consumer durables also make up a relatively small share of

Soviet consumption. On the other hand, the very large share of consumption that is directed to education reflects the fact that the Soviet Union provides universal elementary and secondary education to its citizens and offers a university education to a higher percentage of its people than any Western nation except the United States and Canada

Consumption patterns in the USSR have changed substantially during the past several decades, but the Soviet pattern in 1985 is far more similar to that of the United States in 1960 than in 1985 (see figure 6). The share of food in overall consumption, for instance, dropped in the United States and the Soviet Union, although the Soviet share in 1985 was still larger than the US share in 1960. The percentage of consumer durables in Soviet consumption was almost twice as high in 1985 as in 1960, yet this 1985 share was about 60 percent of that found in the United States in 1960. Similarly, despite substantial growth in Soviet household services, the share in 1985 was still only about 55 percent of the US share.

Food. The level of per capita food consumption in the Soviet Union in 1980-valued in international dollars-was well below the level in the United States and the developed West European nations and was even below that of many Latin American and East European countries (see figure 7). However, according to data collected by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the nutrient content of the Soviet food supply closely resembles that of Western nations.5 The number of calories available per capita in the USSR nearly matches that in the United States and exceeds that of several developed OECD nations. Similarly, the Soviet protein level falls well within the range of that typical of developed Western nations, although the source of the nutrients differs sharply (see figure 8). Nearly half of the calories in the Soviet food supply, for instance, are provided by grain products and potatoes—compared with one-fourth in the United States. The relative


Figure 6
Consumption Patterns in the USSR and the United States, 1960 and 1985



Note: Because values in international dollars are not available for 1960, all data are based on the geometric mean of shares calculated for each country in both rubles and dollars.

Figure 7
Per Capita Food Consumption, 1980

Thousand 1980 international dollars



.22(*** * 89

See also Ann M. Lane, Ruth M. Marston, and Susan O. Welsh, "The Nutrient Content of the Soviet Food Supply and Comparisons with the US Food Supply," Gorbachev's Economic Plans (Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 1987), Vol. 2, pp. 79-95

Figure 8
Nutrient Content of Food Supplies,
1983-85

Note scale change

Vegetable products Animal products

Calories per capita per day

	e 500 200 site site
Greece	
United States	THE RESIDENCE OF THE PARTY OF T
Hungary	
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France	The second secon
Poland	Carrier visit and the contract of the contract
Argentina	120, 200, 121, 200, 200
Portugal	
United Kingdom	E18 (0.7 (2.7 (2.7 (2.7 (2.7 (2.7 (2.7 (2.7 (2
South Korea	
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Brazil	
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Venezuela	
Indonesia	
Kenya	
India	7
Nigeria	

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Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United States, FAO Production Yearbook, Vol. 40 (Rome: FAO, 1987), pp. 245-248.

preponderance of foods with a low dollar value in the Soviet diet partially explains the apparent discrepancy between the comparison of food consumption measured in dollars and the nutrition comparisons.

Over the last two decades, steady growth in worker income, low retail prices, and rising consumer expectations have markedly increased the demand for high-quality foods in the USSR. Although the composition of the food supply has changed somewhat, Moscow has not been able to match food supplies with consumer preferences. Chronic shortages of even basic foods are widely reported, queuing is pervasive throughout the country, and black marketing in food items has become an integral part of the Soviet economy

Consumer Durables. Valued in international dollars, per capita consumption of consumer durables in the USSR is less than one-fifth the US level and is below that of many Latin American nations (see figure 9). Moreover, Moscow's efforts to improve the availability and selection of durable items such as washing machines, refrigerators, and television sets during the past decade have had only mixed results. Ownership of many durables has increased dramatically, but the assortment continues to be unresponsive to consumer demand. For example, according to Soviet figures, about 75 percent of the consumers who wish to purchase refrigerators want models with a capacity of 7 to 8 cubic feet (most US models have capacities of 17 cubic feet or more). Yet only 12 percent of the units produced are of this size. Of the 4 million washing machines produced every year, only 5 percent are fully automatic. Indeed, most Soviet washing machines require the operator to wring clothes by hand at least once during the wash cycle. Stocks of higher quality items, such as passenger automobiles and modern consumer appliances, also remain extremely low (see figure 10).


* Another reason is that the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations bases its analysis of a nation's food supply on production levels and does not account for waste before or after the food reaches the consumer. The dollar-based consumption data, on the other hand, measure only the food that is actually purchased by consumers and thus omits predelivery waste, which in the Soviet case is substantial

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Figure 9
Per Capita Consumption of Consumer
Durables, 1980

Thousand 1980 international dollars

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


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
Figure 10 Stocks of Consumer Durables

Note scale change

Televisions per 1,000 population, 1983



Motor vehicles per 1,000 population, 1984



Source: US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), p.827.


Consumer Services. International comparisons also indicate that the USSR has a long way to go to become a service-oriented economy. The provision of services remains extremely low in the Soviet Union in comparison with the developed West as a result of decades of neglect by state planners.' Per capita consumption of consumer services in the USSR (in international dollars) is significantly lower than in the developed West and only slightly larger than in such countries as Uruguay and Portugal. (Figure 11 shows a comparison for 1980, the last year for which data are available.) The unfulfilled consumer demand for many household and repair services has led to the development of a widespread and rapidly growing black market for services. Soviet insurance policies have even begun to offer coverage for automobile parts stolen by black marketeers who supply them to unofficial repair operations

Providing more and better services is one of the goals of Gorbachev's program to improve the lot of the consumer. The regime apparently realizes that workers are more likely to respond to higher wages with greater work effort if there are sufficient supplies of higher quality goods and services to buy

Health Care. During the mid-1970s, infant mortality rates and life expectancy worsened in the USSR, an unprecedented event for an industrial nation in peacetime. According to official Soviet statistics, life expectancy has only recently started to climb, and it is still short of the levels reported in the mid-1960s. The Soviet Union ranks well below the developed West in both of these health care—related categories (see figure 12). Infant mortality rates are poor in large part because of the extremely high rate of infant deaths in the Central Asian republics. Officially published Soviet statistics indicate, for instance, that in 1986 infant mortality rates were 5.8 percent in Turkmenistan and more than 4.6 percent in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Figure 11 Consumer Services Per Capita, 1980

Thousand 1980 international dollars



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The rates published for the European republics, however, are similar to those found in Western Europe.

The Soviet health system is greatly overburdened. This situation has arisen, in part, because of an illadvised strategy to concentrate resources on curing illnesses rather than preventing them. The low priority given to manufacturing health care equipment contributes to the problem and helps to explain why the USSR ranks so low (and has for several decades) relative to other countries in the provision of basic health care services to its citizens (see figure 13)


^{&#}x27;For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Gertrude E. Schroeder, "USSR: Toward the Service Economy at a Snail's Pace," Gorbachev's Economic Plans, Vol. 2, pp. 240-260

¹ These figures are misleading, however, because of systematic underreporting of infant deaths and a Soviet definition of infant deaths that is far more lax than that used in other countries. Deaths of infants weighing less than 1,000 grams—World Health Organization guidelines are 500 grams—are labeled "miscarriages" instead of being entered into infant mortality statistic

Figure 12 Health Care Indicators, 1985

Figure 13 Health Expenditures Per Capita, 1980


1980 international dollars



Infant Mortality Rates

Deaths of children under one year per 1,000 live births

. s.gwi



Note: Data are for 1985 or closest year for which data are available.

361-316 306 666.7 Japan United States United Kingdom West Germany Hungary Italy Portugal USSR Poland Uruguay Brazil Argentina Cameroon Indonesia India Kenya South Korea

Participation in the World Economy

Unclassified

On the whole, the USSR's pattern of world trade resembles that of a less developed country such as Egypt or Mexico (see figure 14). Moscow is a large importer of manufactured goods and a large exporter of raw materials-notably oil, gas, and semiprocessed materials. After 60 years of industrialization, the USSR is still largely unable to sell its manufactured products abroad. Soviet exports-including intra-CEMA barter trade-relative to other nations are shown in figure 14. When only hard currency sales are considered, manufactured goods make up approximately 10 percent of Soviet exports, about the same share as in a country such as Ivory Coast. That statistic is particularly notable because the manufacturing sector has always had a high priority in the allocation of investment resources in the USSR

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
Figure 14 Trade Performance, 1985

Note scale change

Nonfuel primary products


Fuels

Manufactured goods a



Share of Manufactured Goods in Exports, 1985 a

Percent of total exports



Note: Non-Soviet data are taken from International Monetary Fund trade statistics.

^a Excluding arms.

Figure 15 Sectoral Shares of GDP

Index: GDP = 1

Agriculture

Industry Industry

Services

	1965	1975	1985
	0 / 10 / 10	1-23 -00 -35 -3	0.00.00.36
Argentina			
Canada			
Denmark			
Greece			
Italy			
Japan			
Kenya			
Norway			
Paraguay			
Philippines	Personal and the second		
Tanzania			
Turkey			
UK			
US			
USSR			

Note: Non-Soviet shares were calculated in indigenous currencies at current prices. Soviet data were calculated in ribles in 1982 factor cost prices.

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Economic Structure

The structure of the Soviet economy is markedly different ffrom that of most developed nations and has changed little since 1975. In particular, compared with other nations at a similar level of development, the Soviet Union has a much larger agricultural sector. According to CIA figures, agriculture has accounted for about 20 percent of the USSR's total output—calculated at factor cost 9—in the 1980s compared with less than 5 percent for most developed Western nations. The share of agricultural output in GDP in the Soviet Union is similar to that in Turkey and the Philippines (see figure 15). Such a large dependence on agriculture causes sometimes erratic annual fluctuation in overall national output—a problem typical of developing nations of the Third World.

See footnote 3/

Percent

Table 3 Average Annual Growth of GDP, 1966-85

	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981-85
USSR	5.1	3.1	2.2	1.8
United States	2.8	2.3	3.3	3.0
France	5.4	4.0	3.3	1.5
West Germany	4.2	2.1	3.4	1.3
Japan	11.0	4.3	5.0	3.9
Italy	- 6.2	2.4	3.8	1.6
Greece	7.2	5.1	4.4	1.3
Portugal	6.3	4.4	5.4	1.0
East Germany	3.1	3.5	2.0	1.9

3.3

6.5

2.0

0.7

0.6

0.6

Sources: CIA Reference Aid CPAS 88-10001 (Unclassified), September 1988, Handbook of Economic Statistics. Greece and Portugal data are from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, National Accounts, Vol. 1. Mail Aggregates, 1960-86 (Paris: OECD, 1988).

3.0

4.0

The Soviet Economic Malaise: **Barriers to Intensive Growth**

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Hungary

Poland


the section is

In the seventies and eighties we lost our previous dynamism to a certain extent. The economy did not succeed in switching over from extensive to intensive growth in time.

1986 Report of CPSU Central Committee

As recently as the late 1960s and early 1970s, rates of economic growth in the USSR were higher than those of the United States and some Western industrialized nations (see table 3). Since the latter half of the 1970s, however, gains have occurred less rapidly. During the past two five-year planning periods, the average annual rate of growth of Soviet GDP fell to around 2 percent or less—the same as or lower than rates of

Figure 16 Soviet GDP as Share of US GDP, 1950-85



Note: Shares are based on a geometric mean comparison of Soviet and US GDP in rubles and dollars.

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growth attained in most Western countries. As a result, by 1985 Soviet GDP-which had increased from less than one-third of US GDP in 1950 to almost 60 percent by 1975—had declined to about 55 percent of US GDP (see figure 16 and inset, "World Perceptions of the Soviet Economic Model")

World Perceptions of the Soviet Economic Model

The Soviet Union's primary influence on world events will be through its economic policy and its ocioeconomic achievements

V. I. Lenin

Market Williams

In the early 1960s the Soviet economy was growing apially and with the launch of Sputnik, the USSR demonstrated its scientific prowess to the world. In isscontext Khrushchev's boast of the superiority Of the Soviet system did not seem entitely abstrained the Soviet Union sustained this periods high rate of growth, its GDP would have nearly equaled that of the United States by the mid=1980s (see graph).

In article in Roblems of Communism during the eriodicaptures the mood of the times.


The world image of the United States as the lland of consumer plenty and the bindiplace of the affluent society is well-established. This will Sovier Union may overtake the US in constan goods within a relatively short time cannot tail therefore to make a deep impression on the underdeveloped countries; asswell as on some of the more mature Western nations whose consumption standards remain tarthelow those of the US

More than 20 years later, the image of the Sower model of socialist development is becoming the number all secretary Gorbachev, adultes since meeting approgatie celebration of the 70 in amily sary of the Great October Socialist Revolution noted that the economic problems of the Soviet Unionshadbrepercussions abroadsMV/courselves deltistrongly/how/in the period/oftstagnation/file international impetus of socialism had lessened thaterestructuring in the USSR became vital from this pointfoffview as well."

Imogene Erro Catching Up and Outstripping An Appraisal Problems of Communism (July-August 1961), pp. 22-30.


rbachev Addresses 4 Nov Meeting," as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service SOV 87-213 (Unclassified), 4 November 1987, p. 2.

The Failed Vision of the 1950s: Soviet Versus US GDP, 1950-85



Aciozdius (o zejeris) jeun a number of Third World nations, Corbustevijas alemated only nari of Themroblem. The Soviet economic model has become less attractive to Third World nations. The reason for this decline hovever, has more to do with the experience of Tathborner patients with Soviet style economic voltats than with events in the Soviet Unions in Central, Imerica, for a property of the failure of Grous and Meagarine ecopo-smissioprovide a decent living stantiar also their people is largely responsible for the lack of priblic backing for Soviet-style economic politics in that region Similarly, economic failuress in Victiam e Cambodia Laos, Ethlopia, and Mozambidae fray had a profound influence on neighboring countries

(actin)



wi

Simply put, the growth formula that propelled the Soviet Union to world power status—a massive infusion of labor and capital—no longer works. With labor reserves scarcer and the return on investment falling rapidly, continued growth will have to come from increased productivity of capital and labor. Efforts to increase the quality and quantity of output and make better use of available resources have been frustrated, however, by a relatively backward technological base, inflexible production processes, and, perhaps most important, a cumbersome and inefficient system of planning and management and a distorted structure of incentives (see inset, "Rating Moscow's Growth Performance").

William Baumol concluded in a recent study that these latter characteristics, shared to various degrees by the centrally planned economies in the world, are responsible for the unimpressive productivity record in the USSR that has contributed heavily to the poor performance of its economy. Taking a century-long view of labor productivity, Baumol argues that the lower the initial level of labor productivity is in an industrialized economy, the higher its long-run productivity growth is likely to be. As a result, international differences in productivity growth should converge toward the productivity levels of the leaders. Baumol attributes this convergence largely to spillovers of innovation-and, to a lesser extent, of investment-from the leading to the lagging countries. He found, however, that since 1950 labor productivity in centrally planned economies has converged more slowly, and to a generally lower level, than in market economies.10

¹⁰ See William J. Baumol, "Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the Long-Run Data Show," *American Economic Review* (December 1986): pp. 1,072-1,085.

The Soviet leadership has responded to the slide in economic performance by calling for higher rates of productivity growth, setting higher targets for conservation of materials, and placing more emphasis on stepping up the rate of technological change. Indeed. Gorbachev's original program for changing the Soviet economy called for the rapid renewal of the stock of plant and equipment by a combination of high rates of investment and increased rates of retirement of old plant and equipment, a more efficient and better coordinated research and development effort, better incentives for people to work harder and more effectively, and "radical" economic reform designed to streamline the economy and make it more efficient. Progress has been painfully slow, however, and in many areas nonexistent-productivity gains continue at a low level, the leadership has made little progress in getting enterprises to use resources more efficiently, and the Soviet Union continues to lag Western nations in technological development

Figure 17 GDP Per Worker, 1985

Thousand 1980 international dollars

United States	
Canada	
West Germany	
France	
Netherlands	
Italy	
United Kingdom	
Japan	
East Germany	
Czechoslovakia	
Hungary	
USSR	
Greece	
Poland	
Portugal	
Romania	
Brazil	
South Korea	
Philippines	

Note: Figures for South Korea and the Philippines are for 1983. Figure for Brazil is for 1982.

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Labor Productivity

Labor productivity is the main thing, the most important thing for the victory of socialism.


V. I. Lenin

In a recently completed comparison of labor productivity, Abram Bergson concluded that socialist economies are systematically less efficient than their Western counterparts." Comparisons of the level of GDP per worker support Bergson's conclusions. Output per worker in the Soviet Union ranks well below that in

Figure 18 Productivity Change, 1973-84

Average annual growth in percent

- Total factor productivity
- Capital productivity
- ▲ Labor productivity



Source of non-Soviet data: Agnus Maddison, "Growth and Slowdown in Advanced Capitalist Economies," Journal of Economic Literature, (June 1987), pp. 649-698.

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most developed nations and is even lower than in many East European nations. Indeed, in 1985 GDP per worker in the USSR was less than half that in the United States (see figure 17).

Nor has there been much improvement in productivity trends in the USSR. Since the mid-1970s, Soviet labor productivity has improved slightly, but this gain has been more than offset by a large drop in capital productivity (see figure 18). Total factor productivity (that of labor and capital combined) declined by about 1.5 percent per year during 1973-84. Although the growth in Soviet labor productivity was about the same as in the United States during the period, the decline in Soviet capital productivity was the sharpest of any nation analyzed

[&]quot;Bergson found the productivity margin between East and West to be between 25 and 34 percent in the 1970s, based on calculations of material output per worker after normalizing for size of capital stock and quality of labor. See Abram Bergson, "Comparative Productivity: The USSR, Eastern Europe, and the West," American Economic Review (June 1987): pp. 342-357

Energy Efficiency

To assess the energy intensity of the Soviet Union relative to other nations, energy consumption per capita was compared graphically with per capita GDP for a large number of countries (see figure 19). The results show a direct correlation between a nation's level of development and its energy consumption. In the case of the centrally planned economies, however, although this direct relationship still holds, the trend line is much higher, indicating that energy resources are used less efficiently than in the other countries examined. Moreover, Hungary—the CEMA nation having the most decentralized system 12—is closest to the world trend line, while the other CEMA nations showed far higher levels of energy consumption than their level of development would seem to indicate. The effect of central planning on energy efficiency is not surprising, given internal (and intra-CEMA) prices that do not reflect actual costs of production and the economic environment in which plant managers operate.


Technological Development


The party views acceleration of scientific and technical progress as the main direction of its economic strategy, as the main lever for the intensification of the national economy.

Mikhail Gorbachev 1985

As Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders acknowledge, many of the Soviet Union's economic problems stem from its inability to compete in high-technology fields and to efficiently integrate technological advances into the production process. Over the years, the Soviets have made extensive use of technology transfer—both legal and illegal—in an attempt to cope with this problem. At the same time, the regime is concerned about becoming technologically dependent on the West, as many Soviet officials argue that such dependence would make the USSR susceptible to Western political pressures and retard the development of product and process innovation at home. As a result, the Soviets have devoted substantial resources to encouraging homegrown technological innovation.

Figure 19
Energy Consumption and Economic
Development: CEMA Versus Non-CEMA
Countries, 1985





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Despite Moscow's efforts to overcome its technological backwardness in the civil sector, the Soviet Union lags the West significantly in most fields:

- Although the USSR pioneered the process of continuous casting of steel, by 1983 only 12 percent of Soviet steel was continuously cast, compared with 31 percent in the United States, 65 percent in France, and 86 percent in Japan.
- The USSR has made impressive gains in developing a capability to produce computers, yet new Soviet models tend to be copies of obsolete US models. Moreover, computer inventories in the USSR are only a fraction of what they are in the United States: in 1987 there were only about 100,000

^{··} Yugoslavia, a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), is considered a market socialist nation. In terms of energy efficiency, it falls near the world trend line.

personal computers in use in the Soviet Union, compared with 40 million in the United States. US sales in 1988 were expected to reach 10 million.

• The Soviet Union is by far the world's largest producer of machine tools, but their mix tends to be greatly skewed toward simpler, less modern tools. Even Soviet tools that employ the same technology as their Western counterparts lack durability, precision, and flexibility.

Nowhere is the technological lag more evident than at the grassroots of Soviet society. One of the most striking features of the high-tech revolution in the West has been the degree to which it has permeated society. Hand-held calculators, personal computers, and portable cassette players are largely taken for granted in the West but are available in the Soviet Union only in small numbers. For instance, in Soviet elementary and secondary schools there was only one personal computer per 575 students in 1987 versus one for every 25 students in the United States.

Even the telephone, often found in several rooms in American homes, has not yet become commonplace in many areas in the Soviet Union. According to *Pravda*, only 23 percent of urban families and 7 percent of families in rural areas had private telephones in 1985. The Soviet Union is similar to less developed countries in Latin America in the number of telephones in use (see figure 20).

Figure 20 Telephone Ownership, 1984

Units per 1,000 population

	_
	经验证的 经现代的 经证据
	0 200 (00 800
77 : 10	
United States	
Denmark	
France	
West Germany	
Japan	
Spain	
Ireland	
Czechoslovakia	
East Germany	
South Korea	
Uruguay	
Poland	
USSR	
Panama	
Brazil	
Turkey	
Kenya	
Ethiopia	

Note: US figure is for 1982.

Outlook: The Soviet Economy Into the 21st Century

Whereas Soviet leaders once spoke confidently of overtaking the West, in recent years General Secretary Gorbachev and other officials have openly discussed the prospect of the USSR being relegated to the status of a third-rate economic power. In response, the regime has pushed through a set of "radical" economic and political reform measures aimed at reversing the Soviet Union's slide relative to the rest of the world. Specifically, Soviet plans call for growth rates to climb steadily from the approximately 2 percent per year achieved in the period 1981-85 to an annual rate of 5 percent by the year 2000.

A Soviet View

A Soviet view of what the realization of such plans would mean for Moscow's international standing was provided last year in an article in the journal, Sorevnovaniye Dvukh Sistem (Competition Between the Two Systems).13 In this study, the Soviet growth rates planned for 1986-2000 are juxtaposed with Soviet projections for growth of various other world economies to illustrate the effect of perestroyka and acceleration on the international economic balance of power (see figure 21)." According to this study, by the turn of the century, not only will the Soviet Union's economy remain the second largest in the world, but it will also exceed in size the combined economies of France, Italy, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. China and Japan would continue to trail the Soviet Union, although their relative positions would reverse over the period.


"B. M. Bolotin, "Problems of Economic Competition Between Two Systems (A Comparative Analysis)," Competition Between the Two Systems (Moscow: The Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1988), pp. 112-142.

Despite the race that the Soviet comparisons are based on the Marxist concept of national income produced rather than GDP, the Soviet forecasts of Western growth are remarkably similar to those published by commercial forecasting services in the West. Soviet estimates of US and European annual growth rates are 2.6 and 2.4 percent, respectively. Soviet estimates of Japanese and Chinese growth are somewhat more optimistic than some Western figures: 3.9 and 7.8 percent, respectively. The implied growth rate for the Soviet Union is 4.6 percent

Figure 21
A Soviet View of the Future: National Income Produced

Trillion international dollars


1981-1985 1996-2000



Note: According to the Soviet study, these figures are average levels for the five-year period indicated, recalculated in dollars according to purchasing power parity.

^aThe European Big Four are France, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Figure 22 CIA Versus Soviet Projections of Economic Growth in the USSR Between 1985 and 2000 ^a



CIA projections b

^aCIA measures the USSR's economic growth in terms of the Western concept of GNP. (The figures shown are calculated from data in 1982 factor cost prices.) The Soviets use the Marxist concept of national income produced, which excludes depreciation and the nonmaterial component of services. (The figures shown are calculated from data in so-called comparable prices—the Soviet version of constant prices.) If the Soviet data were adjusted to make them comparable to GNP, the difference between the Soviet and CIA projections would probably be even greater.

bBased on simulations that account for possible increases in worker effort (human factor effects), capital modernization, and reform initiatives implemented so far. The model also assumes a period of disruption occurs in implementing Gorbachev's programs. In the worst-case scenario, it is assumed that there is no recovery from the slump that occurs and consequently no payoff in the form of higher productivity in the 1990s. In the best-case scenario, it is assumed that the economy recovers from the disruptions and that a payoff occurs in the form of higher returns on labor and capital in the 1990s.

CIA Assessment

We believe that the economic growth laid out by the Soviets—which requires a marked reversal of negative economic trends—is implausible. 15 For comparison purposes we have laid out likely "bounding" scenarios for Soviet economic growth between now and the start of the 21st century (see figure 22). A juxtaposition of those scenarios with that which the Soviets project suggests that the USSR will have difficulty maintaining its current relative standing with respect to GDP. With regard to measures such as per capita consumption, the production of high-technology goods, or the provision of high-quality services to the populace, narrowing the gap between the Soviet Union and the West is likely to be an even more difficult task. Yet. as the Soviets themselves have come to acknowledge, itais on the basis of such specific measures of consumer welfare and technological dynamism, rather than on the basis of gross economic size, that the vitality of the USSR's economy—or the extent of its economic dilemma—should ultimately be assessed.

"Our analysis is examined in several publications, including a joint CIA-DIA paper DDB-1900-140-87! August 1987, Gorbachev's Modernization Program: A Status Report on 15-16 and DI Technical Intelligence Report October 1987, Modeling Soviet Modernization: 1 cospects for Economic Growtl

Appendix A

Methodology of International Comparisons

In many respects, the problems encountered in making international economic comparisons are analogous to those faced when making comparisons within one nation across time: price differences as well as variations in preferences and tastes must be accommodated. In a given country, prices for virtually all goods change between time periods, though at varying rates, and consumer tastes and preferences may shift significantly, as reflected in the mix of goods and services purchased. Similarly, in international comparisons, prices expressed in local currencies differ among nations, and the mixes of goods and services consumed are typically quite diverse. In either case, the goal is to value each good or service in each economy at a common price in a common unit of currency. This is accomplished by converting national account data in nominal terms to a common base either by using intertemporal price indexes—commonly called price deflators-or international price indexes-commonly called purchasing power parities (PPPs).

The calculation and use of PPPs were pioneered by the United Nations in its International Comparison Project (ICP), and most of the data used in this paper are derived from various UN benchmark studies. Since the Soviet Union has not participated in the ICP, the CIA's bilateral comparisons of the US and Soviet economies were linked to the ICP data base.

The ICP methodology assigns an average world price or "international price" to each good or service produced by any of the countries being compared. The size of a country's output is measured by calculating the value of its products using these "international prices." Comparisons among countries are made by comparing these values."

The major advantage of "international price" comparisons is that they use "country neutral" prices. Index number theory and empirical studies show that, when a single nation's expenditure pattern is used to provide weights in a comparison, the results are almost invariably less favorable to that country than if some other country's weights are used. The use of an international average set of weights, therefore, places no single country at a comparative disadvantage

Because this paper drew on various sources for comparative data, a reconciliation of the data was necessary. A comparison of the Soviet and US economies in the mid-1970s was carried out several years ago by the CIA ²⁰ and has been updated to the present using data on US gross national product (GNP) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce and data on Soviet GNP from the set of GNP accounts compiled by the CIA.

"The UN International Comparison Project began in 1968 with a pilot study comparing the purchasing powers of currency and real product for a handful of West European countries. In subsequent years, benchmark studies for 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1980 and partial results for a fifth benchmark (for the year 1985) have been completed, and the set of participating countries has grown to 60. Most major countries have actively participated in the ICP, with the exception of the USSR, China, and several East European countries

"China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany have also never participated in the ICP; our estimates of GDP for these nations were also linked to the ICP data base. The method by which these four nations' GDP was estimated is discussed in detail in appendix B

"For a detailed description of the procedure, see Michael Ward, Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures in the OECD (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1985) and Multilateral Measurements of Purchasing Power and Real GDP (Luxembourg: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1982)

In the case of a Soviet-US comparison, when US weights are used in the calculation, the Soviet economy is 69 percent as large as that of the United States, but when Soviet weights are used, it is only 41 percent as large

"See Imogene Edwards, Margaret Hughes, and James Noren, "U.S. and U.S.S.R.: Comparisons of GNP," Soviet Economy in a Time of Change (Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 1979), pp. 369-401 and Joint Economic Committee, Consumption in the USSR: An International Comparison (Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 1981)

Ruble/dollar ratios for 18 categories of goods and services, derived in these CIA comparison studies, were used to compare the relative size of the US and Soviet economies in both rubles and dollars. The geometric mean of the two results was used as a point estimate of the relative size of the two economies.

After reconfiguring the GNP comparisons slightly to make them compatible with the narrower definition of gross domestic product (GDP), the geometric mean ratio of the Soviet and US economies was applied to the "international dollar" value of the size of the US economy to derive an "international dollar" value for Soviet GDP.²¹

"This procedure for linking nonparticipating nations to a global comparison is very much like that used for East European nations in the ICP. For both practical and political reasons, the ICP was forced to use geometric mean comparisons to link the participating East European nations into the global comparison in the two most recent benchmark studies. Austria is the country used for binary comparisons with Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Although this is not the optimal approach, ICP researchers do not believe that the results are seriously distorted by this procedure.

The figures for the United States and the USSR were compared with estimates of GDP in 1985 for other nations—including four in Eastern Europe 2—compiled by the United Nations and published by Robert Summers and Alan Heston in a recent article in the Review of Income and Wealth. Finally, the data set was expanded to include three additional East European countries and China, using the "physical indicator" technique described in appendix B.

²² Although Romania did not participate in the two most recent ICP benchmark studies, the results of its participation in an earlier benchmark were updated and used in this study, along with the more current data for Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. (**)

²³ Alan Heston and Robert Summers, "A New Set of Inte...ational Comparisons of Real Product and Prices for 130 Countries, 1950-85," Review of Income and Wealth (March 1988): pp. 1-25. The tables in the Heston and Summers article provide data for the years \$\frac{227}{279}50-85\$ and are, for the most part, based on the results of three ICP benchmark studies. Regional fixity was removed from the 1980 study, and the various benchmark data were made as consistent as possible. Data for 121 market economies and four centrally planned economies—Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia—were used in this study. The data were included as a supplement to the article. ""

Appendix B

The Physical Indicator Method for Estimating Gross Domestic Product in Dollars

The UN's International Comparison Project (ICP) data, based on purchasing power parities (PPPs) rather than market exchange rates,24 are available for more than 60 nations. They represent the best available estimates, by far, of the relative sizes of these countries' economies.25 Although the Soviet Union has never participated in the ICP, comparable data derived with PPPs are available from a series of CIA studies, the most recent of which was presented to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1981.26 Although the quality of these studies is good, they have become somewhat dated. Benchmark data are routinely indexed forward in time using price indexes, but this practice has its limits. Officials working on the ICP consider five years to be the useful life of a benchmark, and the European Community has begun partial updates on an annual basis to limit the effect of indexing errors. Since the newest study of the USSR is more than 10 years old and some components of Soviet GDP are estimated on the basis of pre-1970 benchmarks, there is considerable potential for error in these data

** Exchange rates can be used to convert economic aggregates such as GDP from one currency to another, but such calculations are of little use in comparing the size of different economies. For details of the UN_smethod and background on the project, see Alan Heston, Irving B. Kravis, and Robert Summers, World Product and Income, International Comparisons of Real Gross Product (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) and Peter Hill, Multilateral Measurements of Purchasing Power and Real GDP (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1981).

The primary source of national income comparison data for this study is the Penn World Tables, Mark 4. These tables were included in a supplement to the article by Heston and Summers, "A New Set of International Comparisons of Real Product and Prices for 130 Countries. 1950-85."

* Joint Economic Committee, Consumption in the USSR: An International Comparison. See also Edwards, Hughes, and Noren, "U.S. and U.S.S.R.: Comparisons of GNP," pp. 369-401

Until a new benchmark study of the Soviet Union is made, an alternative method of calculating Soviet GDP in dollars is needed to assess the accuracy of the CIA's current estimates. We have created a model that uses physical indicators—such as energy consumption per capita and life expectancy—to estimate a nation's GDP. The physical indicator method has a number of advantages:

- Economy of data. Detailed economic data on a wide variety of sectors are not needed. For our model, in fact, only seven observations are required to generate an estimate of a nation's 1980 GDP in dollars.
- Broad applicability. The method is not unique to the Soviet Union. We used it to estimate the GDP of other non-ICP countries as well, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and China.
- Wide acceptance. The physical indicator method
 was pioneered in the 1960s, and the most recent
 application, a 1973 study by the UN Economic
 Commission for Europe, has been widely cited in
 academic and government publications.²⁷
- Simplicity. The method involves straightforward application of basic statistical theory to interpolate estimates of GDP that are consistent with other figures used in this paper.

[&]quot;Secretariat of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, "Comparative GDP Levels," Economic Bulletin for Europe (Geneva: United Nations ECE, 1980).

The Method

The basic premise of the physical indicator method is that a nation's per capita GDP can be expressed as a function of a set of physical indicators, as follows:

$$GDP = f(I_1, I_2, \dots, I_n). \tag{1}$$

The set of physical indicators $(I_1 ldots I_n)$ would include, for example, measures of health, education, personal consumption, and the structure of the economy. Using data from a cross section of countries, a more general relationship between GDP and the indicator variables can be defined as follows:

$$GDP_i = g(I_{1i}, I_{2i}, \dots, I_{ni})$$
 (2)

where the *i* subscript denotes the *i*th country. This function can be estimated statistically and the results used to "predict" GDP for centrally planned economies not participating in the ICP.

The Data. We obtained per capita GDPs for 57 countries participating in the ICP from the Phase IV ICP results; data are for 1980 and are denominated in 1980 international dollars. Data on 22 physical indicators were obtained from the World Bank data base and a variety of other sources (see table 6 in appendix C). The data encompassed the following categories:

Health Indicators
Infant mortality rate
Life expectancy at birth*
Population per physician
Persons per hospital bed

Education Adult literacy rate Newspapers per person

Diet
Calories in food supply,
animal and vegetable sources
Protein in food supply,
animal and vegetable sources
Consumption of meat
Consumption of fish

Basic Industrial Products
Energy consumption*
Steel consumption*
Cement production
Newsprint consumption

Consumer Durables Radio receivers Televisions* Passenger cars* Telephones*

Economic Structure
Percent of labor force in industry
Percent of labor force in agriculture*


Note: Asterisks denote variables selected for use by our model.

The Country Set. Figure B-1 shows the nations we included. Botswana and Luxembourg were dropped from the ICP country set because of the unavailability of physical indicator data. The United States was also deleted because of methodological inconsistencies in the ICP calculations.²⁶

One of the criticisms of earlier efforts to use the physical indicator method to predict the GDP of centrally planned economies is the absence of such economies in the predictor country set. The participation of Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia in Phase IV of the ICP enabled us to make use of data from these countries both to provide more theoretically sound results and to assess the results for centrally planned economies.

Regression Weights. Because the principal aim of our analysis was to estimate GDP for centrally planned economies, a weighted regression was used to overcome the bias in the country set toward less developed countries (LDCs) in Africa and Latin America and to emphasize the three important East European nations. Countries were grouped into three broad categories—wealthy developed nations, moderately developed nations (which include three East European nations), and LDCs—and weights were assigned to equalize the influence of each group on the leastsquares regression calculation. Further subdivisions were created within the latter two groups, and subweights were assigned to balance the representation of each subgroup within its larger category. Figure B-1 shows the relative weights of the various country groups before and after the weighting scheme was introduced

³⁸ The US participation in the 1980 benchmark study was belated and, as a result, methodologically substandard. Various academics have observed that the value for US GDP appears to be too low in that ICP study, a conclusion supported by the results of our model.



USSR

The Model. Two estimates of GDP were empirically derived using regression techniques and the data described above. One was based on a linear variant of the model:

$$GDP_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 I_{1i} + \alpha_2 I_{2i} + \ldots + \alpha_n I_{ni} \quad (3)$$

and one was based on a nonlinear variant:

$$GDP_{i} = e^{\beta_{0}} I_{1_{i}}^{\beta_{1}} I_{2_{i}}^{\beta_{2}} \dots I_{n_{i}}^{\beta_{n}}$$
 (4)

The physical indicator variables were selected using stepwise regression techniques, the results of which are shown on pages 30 and 31. Five variables, significant at the 0.05 level, were selected by the procedure for each model. Three of the variables were used in both models—percent of labor force in agriculture, personal automobiles, and energy consumption per capita. Steel consumption and telephones were the additional variables selected for the linear model, while televisions and life expectancy were selected for the nonlinear model.

The Results

The model predictions of both variants were remarkably similar, in spite of the difference in functional form and in the set of predictor variables. The residuals (the difference between the model predictions and actual GDP) for most countries, for instance, were relatively small and similar in both cases, as shown in the table on page 32. Predictions of GDP for the centrally planned economies not included in the ICP study were also similar (see table B-1). Consequently, the linear and nonlinear formulations were judged to be generally equivalent, and the average of the two predictions was taken as the final estimate of GDP.

Soviet Union. Although the physical indicator method is markedly different from that used by the CIA to estimate Soviet GDP in dollars, the results of the two approaches are virtually identical—our model yields a figure of \$5,630 for the value of per capita GDP in the

Table B-1

Estimates of 1980 Per Capita
GDP for Selected Centrally
Planned Economies

	Linear	Nonlinear	Average
Bulgaria	4,745.5	4,968.7	4,857
China	618.3	765.8	692
Czechoslovakia	7,566.8	7,011.0	7,289
East Germany	7,438.4	7,663.3	7,551
Romania •	4,579.7	3,869.5	4,225

To test the model's performance, we estimated Romania's GDP using the model. In the rest of this paper, however, we used the Estimate from the Penn World Tables, derived from the 1975 ICP estimate (Romania dropped out of the project before the 1980 results were published). The results: Penn World Tables, \$3,946; our model estimate, \$4,225.

5,364.5

5.896.0

Table B-2 Per Capita GDP for Selected East European Countries, 1980

1980 international dollars

5.630

	Physical Indicator Model	Penn World Tables Mark 4	CIA Handbook
Bulgaria	4,857	4,904	4,898
Czechoslovakia	7,289	7,002	6,559
East Germany	7,551	7,891	7,569

Note: Both the Penn World Tables and the CIA Handbook Estimates are derived from the Economic Commission for Europe's physical indicator study. The Penn World Tables extrapolate from the 1973 estimate, whereas the CIA extrapolates from the 1970 figure. Both use growth rates from L. W. International Financial Research, Inc. to index the benchmarks forward, and both adjust the estimates for consistency with ICP-participating East European nations.

[&]quot;The nonlinear variant of the model was converted to linear form using logarithmic transformation before estimating the regression parameters

Soviet Union in 1980, compared with the \$5,600 obtained using the purchasing power parity approach.

Eastern Europe. The estimates obtained for the three non-ICP European nations are extremely close to figures derived from the UN Economic Commission for Europe's physical indicator study for 1970 and 1973 (see table B-2). Although the Commission's study was not intended to provide estimates of GDP consistent with those of the ICP ³⁰ and used exchange rates as the basis for its regression equations, its results have been widely used in the absence of any reasonable alternative. Since the method we used here is theoretically preferable to that of the Commission—and because it produces estimates for a later year—our results were used in the comparisons in this paper

China. There have been few estimates made of the size of China's economy relative to those of other nations, in part because China has traditionally guarded its data and because the data that is available may be flawed by irrational prices and other shortcomings. In 1981 Irving Kravis conducted a cursory price study, which serves as the basis for the entries for China in the Penn Tables, but his estimate of per capita GDP-\$1,600 in 1980-is generally thought to be too high. On the other hand, exchange-rate-derived estimates are probably too low, showing China's total economy to be roughly the size of Poland's.31 Consequently, we lack methodologically sound estimates with which to compare our results. Still, our results appear reasonable. They place China in a position similar to that of India and well behind those of Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea (see table B-3).

'\, Septem-

Table B-3
Estimates of Per Capita GDP
for China and Selected Asian Countries

	Per Capita GDP	
China	692	
India	614	
Indonesia	1,063	
South Korca	2,369	
Thailand	1,694	

^{*} Secretariat of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, "Comparative GDP Levels." The ECE researchers stated that their basic objective was to derive satisfactory approximations of GDP, but they acknowledged that their method "does represent a step away from the GDP concept.... [The estimates] represent an expression of economic attainment which goes in some ways beyond the conventional GDP measure." Hence, the result is, by design, more an index of level of development or well-being than a dollar GDP estimate

[&]quot;See Cl., Reference Aid CPAS 88-10001 ber 1988, Handbook of Economic Statistics, p. 25

Statistical Results for Linear Variant of the Model

 $GDP = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(LFA) + \alpha_2(SC) + \alpha_3(TEL) + \alpha_4(PC) + \alpha_3(EPC)$

where:

GDP = 1980 per capita gross domestic product in international dollars,

LFA = percentage of labor force in agriculture,

SC = steel consumption per capita (kilograms),

TEL =telephones per 1,000 population,

PC = personal automobiles per 1,000 population,

EPC = energy consumption per capita (kilogram coal equivalent).

Analysis of Variance

Source Degrees of Sum of Меап F Value Significance Adjusted Freedom Squares Square Model 942,168,406 188,433,681 398.527 0.0001 0.9736 Error 49 23,168,464.2 472,825.8 Corrected total 53 965,336,870

Parameter Estimates

Variable	Parameter	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	T for HO: Parameter = 0	Probability
ntercept	α,	3.598.33200	265.63723	13.546	0.0001
LFA	α,	-4,358.32008	486.67167	-8.955	1000.0
SC	α,	1.83537817	0.69891375	2.626	0.0115
EL	α,	4.73801046	0.80013174	5.922	0.0001
C	α,	4.02225251	1.42294679	2.827	0.0068
EPC	α,	0.20453033	0.05434701	3.763	0.0004

Statistical Results for Nonlinear Variant of the Model

 $\log (GDP) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log (PC) + \beta_2 \log (LFA) + \beta_3 \log (EPC) + \beta_4 \log (TVS) + \beta_5 \log (LE),$

where:

GDP = 1980 per capita gross domestic product in international dollars,

81.03814601

PC = personal automobiles per 1,000 population,

LFA = percentage of labor force in agriculture,

EPC = energy consumption per capita (kilogram coal equivalent),

TVS = televisions per 1,000 population,

LE = life expectancy at birth.

56

Analysis of Variance

Source Degrees of Sum of Mean F Value Significance Adjusted Freedom Squares Square of F Model 5 79.09964993 15.819930 416.207 1000.0 0.9737 Error 51 1.93849608 0.038010

Parameter Estimates

Corrected total

Variable	Parameter	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	T for HO: Parameter=0	Probability > [T]
ntercept	β,	0.54266347	1.16187237	0.467	0.6424
PC	β,	0.12331045	0.03723083	3.312	0.0017
LFA	β,	-0.18178865	0.03333398	-5.454	0.0001
EPC	β,	0.14366535	0.04622281	3.108	0.0031
rvs	β,	0.12798850	0.03732956	3.429	0.0031
.E	β,	1.23828638	0.30693216	4.034	0.0012

Residuals for Linear and Nonlinear Variants of the Model

	Per Capita GDP	Linear Variant Residual	Nonlinear Variant Residual		Per Capita GDP	Linear Variant Residual	Nonlinear Variant Residual
Argentina	4,342	-275.9	-725.0	Kenya	662	302.5	-209.0
Austria ·	8,230	48.6	396.1	Madagascar	589	713.2	-17.1
Belgium	9,228	345.4	-1,134.1	Malawi	417	515.7	43.2
Bolivia	1,529	-157.8	382.2	Mali	356	NA	-17.2
Brazil	3,356	26.5	211.7	Morocco	1,199	-405.4	-352.2
Cameroon	875	NA	278.9	Netherlands	9,036	-478.91	-311.1
Canada	11,332	-650.1	115.6	Nigeria	824	-516.5	113.9
Chile	4,271	789.5	1,015.2	Norway	11,094	1,061.57	1,407.4
Colombia	2,552	-547.2	-52.9	Pakistan	989	-252.8	21.5
Costa Rica	3,031	-278.6	-45.1	Panama	2,810	-691.8	-857.2
Denmark	9,598	199.2	911.0	Paraguay	1,979	313.6	424.2
Dominican Republic	1,868	44.6	-75.6	Реги	2,456	164.5	553.1
Ecuador	2,607	779.8	558.4	Philippines	1,551	-289.1	5.4
El Salvador	1,410	-238.0	-437.7	Poland	5,006	-251.6	-87.5
Ethiopia	325	188.2	-29.2	Portugal	3,733	-501.1	-591.1
Finland	8,393	-257.1	589.9	Senegal	744	329,3	92.7
France	9,688	820.2	1,245.8	South Korea	2,369	-1,021,1	-280.0
Greece	4,383	-305.3	-30.2	Spain	6,131	-204.67	-109.1
Guatemala	1,952	493.6	454.2	Sri Lanka	1,199	-164.1	50.7
Honduras	1,075	16.9	-195.7	Tanzania	353	311.6	-131.9
Hong Kong	7,268	1,045.79	919.3	Tunisia	1,845	-708.0	-160.2
Hungary	5,508	286.3	203.7	United Kingdom	7,975	-747.64	-2,456.2
ndia	614	-63.2	-45.4	Uruguay	4,502	261.7	-32.5
ndonesia	1,063	-243.4	92.9	Venezuela	4,424	-108.0	-24.9
reland	4,929	-686.5	-1,085.0	West Germany	9,795	279.88	74.3
srael	6,145	-75.92	109.3	Yugoslavia	4,733	514	234.6
taly	7,164	-372.89	80.7	Zambia	716	-239.0	-471.8
vory Coast	1,110	706.2	40.2	Zimbabwe	930	-596.7	-351.9
Japan	8,117	-25.37	177.7				

Appendix C

Selected Data

Selected data for 130 countries for the period 1965-85 are presented in tables C-1 through C-5. With the exception of the Soviet Union, China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, data are from the Penn World Tables, Mark 4.²² Data for the East European nations and China were calculated using the physical indicator method described in appendix B. Table C-6 presents the data set used in the construction of the physical indicator model. The Soviet data are CIA estimates.

"See Heston and Summers, "A New Set of International Comparisons of Real Product and Prices: Estimates for 130 Countries, 1950-1985."

771525 771525

1525 1525 1525 172144 28.855 28.29 28.29 28.29 29.22 20.

79543 79554 79554

1010 1010

1000 1000

Million 1980 international dolla

119405 65035 65035 1244 65035 1244 957800 957800 957800 957800 957800 957800 957800 957

Million 1980 international dollars

٠	ı	٥	
	,	1	

	1965	1966	1967	1961	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	•
Arghanistan Angola Angola Argentina Australia Australia Bahrain Bahrain Barbados Barbados Barbados Barbados	11115 11923 5347 22283 11388 7255 7255 7448	11371 12267 5459 22609 11651 7308 7308 61937 61937	11634 12621 5575 22940 11799 11799 11799 11799 236	11902 12986 5693 23276 12009 12009 12009 12009 237 237	12176 13360 5813 23616 12263 12263 7384 7384 66516 237 9613	12457 13746 5935 23962 12507 1426 7426 8117 68117 239	12750 14178 6076 24366 12937 7456 12937 7456 240	13067 14495 14495 24777 13177 7495 7495 72392 242	13383 15065 6375 25195 13380 7525 7526 74368 243	13707 15534 6530 25620 25620 13723 7533 7533 77080 244	1403 a 1601 a 668 7 266 8 7 268 2 138 9 3 75 3 7 7 8 8 7 7 7 8 8 7 7 24 6 9 7 9 5	14401 16522 6852 26480 14033 7540 785 80717 246	14774 17063 17063 26915 14192 14192 7544 300 82599 82599	15156 17624 17624 27349 14358 14358 315 2425	15548 18090 27789 14514 7551 331 86496	15950 18667 18667 28237 14692 7554 7554 85513	16363 19274 7783 28694 14927 7558 90663 90663	16786 19911 7990 29158 15178 15778 15771 376	17222 20577 8202 29627 15369 7549 7549 391 95497	17670 21252 8400 30094 15544 7552 403 98012	18140 21937 8605 30531 15752 7555 100595	•

Luxambourg	Xenya Xuwait Lasotho	Japan Japan	Italy Ivory Coast	Iraq Iraland	Indonesia Iran	Hungary Iceland	Hond Kong	Guinea	Ghana Greece	France	Ethiopia Fidi Finland	Ed Salvador	Dominican Republic East Germany	Cyprus Czechoslovskia	Colombia Congo Costa Rica	Chile China	Central African Republic Chad	Burundi Cameroon Canada	Burkina Burma	Botavana	Belgium Benin Bolivia	Banrain Bangladesh Barbados	Argentina Australia Austria	Afghanistan Algeria Angola	
נננ	9446 476 11963	98883	51987	7976	24078	194	2304	4137	7799 8550	908	25409 464	29389	c 3719 17020	582 14147	1848	8510 734493	1735	3131 5825 19678	4595 24250	508	2332	04.82 235	22283 11388 7255	11115 11923 5347	
335	9789 523 1228	99790	\$2332 \$315	2884	106951	197	2367	420S	7963	9164	26078 475 4581	30203	17058	14224	19022	8682 755277	1763	3174 5955 20048	8258 4687 24802	521 86486	2393	61937 236	22609 11651 7308	11371 12267 5459	
335	10144 575 1002	100725	52667 4475	2900	109192	199	2433	4274	8129 8716	49548	26765 486 4606	30892	17082	595 14277	19617 1121 1590	8853 774945	1791	3217 6088 20412	4780 25366	535 88737	9557 2457	83427 63427	22940 11799 7338	11634 12621 5575	
336	10513	101061	52987	8777 2913	26583	10264	2500 3803	683	8299 8741	933	27470 497 4627	31596	17084	14,323	20179 1149	9025 796238	1820	3261 6225 20744	8370 4875 25943	91046 645 8774	9590 2522	64953 237	23276 12009 7362	11902 12986 5693	
33	10#94 690 1043	103172	53317	2926	27475	10303	4176 2568 3864	4417	8473 8773	20318	28194 508	32316 3458	4168 17076	14284	20647 1178	9197	1849	3305 6364 21028	8434 4972 26533	93416 93416	9613 2589	66516 317	23616 12263 73 84	12176 13360 5813	
340	11290	104345	53661 5000	2936	116201 28397	10337	423S 2639 3959	1490	8620 8793	50772 950	28937 520	33053 35053	17070	14319	21266 1208	9368	1879	3350 6506 21324	8490 5071 27137	4325 577 95 84 7	9638 2657	68117	23962 12507 7426	12457 13746 5935	
345	11737 793 1088	1901	3069 5309	9667 2978	118563	10365	4303 2724	4574 723	8860 8831	51251	29699	33807 3688	17061	14381	21785 1240	9545 866329	1909	3366 6683 21592	8536 5172 27754	4433 592 98169	9673	69774	24366	12750 14178 6076	
348	12201 842 1112	1932	3148 54400 5638	9989	121369	10398	4371 2812 4116	4659 735	9090	\$1701 971	30481	34578 3797	4992 4540 17043	14456	22291	3799 9722 889337	1939	3407 6864 21822	8576 5275	4544 620 100547	9709	72392	24777	13067 14495 6223	
353	12684 12684 1136	1972	3278 54779 5986	10322	124242	10426	2903 4213	. 4746 745	9300	5211 8 981	31284	35366 35366 35366	5022 4671 16980	14549	22571	3874 9899 910525	1970	3576 7051 22072	8621 5380	4658 649 102982	243 9738 2874	74368	25195	13383	
357	2537 13186 948 1161	2008	3377 55130 6357	10665	599665 1271 8 2	215	4512 2996	6054 4835 754	515 9690 8962	52460 992	32108	6522 36172	16925 16925	8597t 019 2261	23309	3951 10026 929358	2002	3647 7242 22364	8679 5487	4775 679 105477	214 9768 2951	77010	25620	13707	
160	2600 13707 1007 1187	2043	3455 55441 6750	11020	613459	10532	3093	6243 4925 762	9970 9977	5270S 1003	32954	36997	5060 4945	1968 609 14772	23502	4030 10196 946721	2034	3720 7439 22697	8721 5596	108032	9795 3029	78877	26052	14038	3
361	2656 14250 1071 1215	2072 112771	3533 35701 7045	11416 3228	627569	10589	3204	6437 5027 771	557 10260 9167	4726 52891 1016	32826	37841	5073 3066 1678	2009 611 14 884	23968	4114 10372 962278	2091	3794 3794 7676	8759 5705	\$020 744	246 9811 3109	285	26480	14401	5
362	2713 14813 1140 1244	2097 113863	3613 \$5930 7352	35441 11840 3272	136427	10637	3320	6636 5132 779	579 10560 9309	\$3077 1029	34782	38794	5088 5191 16765	MEXT 2066	24434	4199 10551 976248	2147	3870 7920	5816	5151 779	247 9 8 22 3192	300	26915	14774	2511
362	2773 15399 1212 1275	2123	3690 56127 7673	36520 122#3	139656	10673	3439	6840 5238 785	10860	4753 53277 1043	35734	721 8	5104 5311 16756	2115 618 15089	24906	10733	2200	3948 3948 8172	8814 5928	5286 815	248 9830 3276	315 84525	27349	15156 17624	15%
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6, 293 2406 326 726 739	9,148 9,148 3,132 5,425	1, 571 343	6,178	278 933 618	8,258 1,476 1,286	6, 708	2 663 2 297	3, 811	439	361	6, 252	2,067	3595	1,112	1.803	2,041	129 NA	2,388	6,113 5,900	926	2,743	2,610	1, 375	624 298	1967
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7,125 2782 337 703 815	6,129 9,594 3,303 4118 6,488	1,678 1,678	6, 667	290 1,033 651	8,848 1,750 1,407	7,152	1,024	1,112	363	724	6,739	2,323	1,081	1,163	1,972	7, 192	522 456	2,317	6, 562	1,018	2,954	1,886	1,450	306	1969
7,443 2885 358 789 810	6,4319 3,459 4393	1,076	6, 957	1,063 644	9,164 1,581	7,401	1,018	1,189	2,869	760 459	7,405	2,575	1,094	1,189	2,093	7, 104 7, 308	630 527	2, 292	6,915	1,020	3,063	2,068	1, 525	673 301	1970
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7,830 3193 375 825 984	6, 591 10, 071 3, 364 4641	1,351 1,885 364 28,717	6, 915	296 1,143 694	1, 863	7.680	1,014	1,366 1,366	3, 522	757 482	9, 437	2,969	1, 147	1,587	795 2,372	7, 821 6, 912	717 623	2, 225	7,441	1,065	3, 239	2, 265 527	1,950	670	1972
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3,067 3681 354 354 1,000	7,082 10,197 3,657	1, 513 2, 250 347	5,591	1,307	2,683	2, 852 1, 041	953	1,829	4, 130	75 8 495	350	3,057	2, 515	1,518	2,417	9.580	705	2,461	8,031	963 789	1,367 3,586	000 660°C	2, 239 333	593	1975
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Percent
Pear 1,000 population
Per Capita per day
Grams per capita per day